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BOOK REVIEW 
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER: CONCENTRATION REGULATION AND 
PuBLIC PoLICY. By Samuel R. Reid. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1976. Pp. xv, 282. $9.95. 
PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: A TEXT-
BOOK IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS CURRENT APPLICATIONS. 
By Daniel Orr. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Com-
pany, Inc., 1976. Pp. xiii, 398. $11.95. 
Economics propels itself into the confines of legal thought 
more than any other discipline. Because so much of our con-
sciousness is committed to the condition of our existence, the 
work of legal institutions is usually intertwined with our eco-
nomic environment. Therefore, while the two disciplines have 
developed divergent theoretical instincts and methods, they 
share a materialist common denominator. Lawyers have a 
practical incentive to understand economics. Legal institutions 
revolve around an economic view of the world which may be 
very archaic and unsophisticated. Legal theory can be en-
hanced by support from economics, but cooperation and 
understanding between the two disciplines is not commensur-
ate with their interrelationship. More effort must be made to 
facilitate communication between economists and attorneys.1 
The legal community should aggressively seek this ex-
change: lawyers armed with a basic understanding of econom-
ics will be more valuable to clients and to society. This has 
been recognized in such areas as antitrust and government 
regulation,2 and recently in other fields oflaw.3 For this reason, 
the books that Reid and Orr have written will be worth any 
lawyer's time. 
1 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960). See Baumol, Reasonable Rules for Rate Regulation: Plausi-
ble Policies for an Imperfect World in THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 187, 
188 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970). 
2 Any of the modern texts on antitrust or trade regulation contain interspersed 
discussions of economics. See, e.g., D. Bots AND P. VERKutL, PUBLIC CoNTROL OF 
BUSINESS (1977); T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1976); A.D. NEALE, 
ANTITRUST'LAWS OF THE USA (1970); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONO!IfiC NOTES 
AND OTHER MATERIALS (1974); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST (1977). 
3 R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). 
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The area of economics most useful to lawyers is microecon-
omics or, more narrowly, industrial organization economics. 
Both books fall into this category, but they differ substantially 
in content. The Reid book presents factual information about 
the performances of our basic economic institutions, whereas 
the Orr book teaches background microeconomic theory to aid 
in understanding the implications of this performance. Yet, 
they both stay comfortably close to situations non-economists 
can identify with. This tangibleness should encourage lawyers 
to study their content. 
The Reid book will be a helpful, but pessimistic, guide to 
economic performance information. In many ways it is a bibli-
ography: it summarizes many of the studies which attempt to 
document the breakdown of our economic structure. Despite 
the pretentious title, it is not a groundbreaking work. It does 
not expound on a "new industrial order," but rather it recapi-
tulates problems and remedies recognized for generations. In-
deed, the author advocates both implicitly and explicitly re-
newed attention to "traditional economic concepts."4 This 
work is valuable as a concise reference. The problems Reid 
emphasizes stay with us for generations and change only, it 
seems, for the worse. Very few authors can create new direction 
for fashionable thinking, but the persistence of our economic 
problems indicates that ready availability of well-established 
information may be more important to improving conditions 
than fashionable new theories would be. 
Reid's theme is the horrors of increased economic concen-
tration. The author blames a wide variety of the ills of our 
economic performance on this concentration and repeatedly 
bemoans the mergers and acquisitions which increase this con-
centration. Relying on his earlier study of the merger move-. 
ment, 5 he provides us with many references to economic indict-
ments of the consolidation of economic power.8 Given the au-
thor's bias, this information will be of great practical utility to 
~ S.R. REID, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER: CONCENTRATION REGULATION AND PUBUC 
POLICY 7 (1976). 
• S.R. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE EcoNoMY (1968). 
1 Readers should not take Reid's conclusions with quite the irrefutable force with 
which they are presented. See Horvitz and Shull, The Bank Merger Act a Decade 
After: Reply to Reid, 19 ANT. BULL. 321 (1974). 
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plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers, challengers of certain regulatory 
actions, and those advocating vigorous antimerger policy; yet 
the book is also worthwhile for those who wish merely to under-
stand why so many take a pessimistic view of our economic 
future. 
The author references studies which show how economic 
concentration adversely affects our everyday existence. As 
investors, for example, we should be impressed by numerous 
demonstrations of the adverse impact of mergers on earnings 
by shareholders. The author shows that the impetus for merg-
ers is the advantage which accrues to managers and corporate 
officers rather than to the corporate entity itself.7 The author 
also shows other ways in which the adverse consequences of 
concentration may touch us directly. He notes, for example, 
that the consolidation of industries decreases demand for 
labor.8 Further, and of interest to law review readers, the au-
thor describes how this decrease in labor demand includes at-
torneys, especially local attorneys. 9 . 
The author claims that the theoretically impossible oc-
currence of inflation combined with decreased demand and 
increased unemployment is the result of the increase in concen-
tration.10 This analysis indicates the relationship industrial 
organization study may have to finding solutions to economy-
wide problems." In particular, we see that the merger move-
ment heats up the economy without increasing industrial out-
put. The result of this industrial organization trend is the ag-
gregate macro-impact known as "stagfiation."12 
7 REID, supra note 4, at 102-03. The disparate interest of managers (technocrats) 
from shareholders and the corporation is discussed in depth by J .K. Galbraith in THE 
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). 
• REID, supra note 4, at 237. 
• Id. at 247. 
10 Id. at 251-55. 
11 Industrial organization economics has much to say about the link between 
structural bottlenecks within markets leading to seemingly unmanageable macroecon-
omics, or economy-wide, problems and about the economists' forecasting failures. See 
W. F. Mueller, Industrial Concentration: An Important Inflationary Force? in 
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 280-306 (H.J. Goldschmid, H.M. 
Mann, & J.F. Weston eds. 1974) and authorities cited therein. 
12 
"Stagflation," the occurrence of stagnation and inflation is, in simple terms, the 
result of mergers which cause an increased transfer of money without producing any-
thing except an increased demand for money. 
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In addition, the impact of increased concentration tran-
scends these specific short-run effects. Reid provides us with 
ample scholarship indicating that increased concentration has 
resulted in a substantial deterioration of our competitive mar-
ket structure. Our economy depends on the automatic regula-
tory devices of the market. It has long been recognized that 
high concentration of economic power inhibits the working of 
the market mechanism. While the local or immediate impact 
of this breakdown receives a significant amount of attention, 
the subtle impact, though less noticeable, is more frightening 
because it may result in the destruction of our econ.omic cul-
ture. Nor is the threat limited to the economic environment; 
the consolidation of economic power also threatens our political 
institutions. 13 
These horrifying prospects have been recognized since eco-
nomic theorists first began to understand how a market econ-
omy works. What is now becoming general knowledge, and 
what Reid makes abundantly clear, is that every remedy is 
absorbed by the seemingly inexorable consolidation move-
ment. He notes that each new major piece of anti-consolidation 
legislation is followed by greatly increased merger activity 
(which is apparently followed by inflation/depression).U This 
cycle raises doubts as to the long-run impact of the recently 
proposed antitrust laws or any other traditional antitrust rem-
edy. Perhaps we need an entirely new direction in our 
legal/economic remedial approaches. 
Reid cites numerous active proposals for reforming anti-
trust laws, including techniques for stopping or reversing con-
centration.15 Yet, one of the major problems 'in microeconom-
ics, ignored by Reid and many industrial organization reform-
ers, is the poor quality of the data. 16 Perhaps previous solutions 
have had negative effects because the first step of reform, se-
13 See J.S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 90-92 (2d ed. 1968). 
11 REm, supra note 4, at 70. 
15 ld. at 264-76. Although receptive to those proposals, he has previously noted 
that the economic environment provides a much better deterrent than legal sanctions. 
ld. at 148, 157. He prefers solutions aimed in this direction. ld. at 273-74. 
11 A Federal Trade Commission study shows, as it could through its special access, 
the deficiencies in the data upon which government economists draw their conclusions. 
STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE QUALITY OF DATA AS A FACTOR 
IN ANALYSES OF STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS (1971). 
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curing accurate information, has not been sufficiently empha-
sized.17 If so, one of the most important developments is the 
tacit authorization of the "line-of-business" reporting function 
in. the Federal Trade Commission.18 Unfortunately, until re-
cently, administrative timidity and judicial interference have 
disarmed this program.19 Hopefully the program will be opera-
tional soon and will be used to formulate effective regulation 
of the economy. Accurate information must precede remedial 
action. 
No doubt anyone touched by Reid's pessimistic economic 
conclusions will support any effort to reverse the trend docu-
mented by the studies compiled in this book. This enlightening 
work deserves the close attention of the entire legal com-
munity. Those who wish to do something will find a valuable 
beginning reference source in Reid's book. 
Orr's book, on the other hand, is much broader and is a 
more objectively theoretical survey of market economics. Al-
though it is labeled a textbook, its treatment of economic theo-
ries is fashioned in a way that should appeal to lawyers. The 
author manages to present the theories so that they relate to 
real-world situations. This is accomplished by effective use of 
realistic examples, sometimes cast as "simple fables." He dem-
onstrates the concept of interest, for example, by our own pref-
erence for a dollar now rather than a year from now: A dollar 
is worth more to us if we receive it today than if we know we 
17 An Antitrust Task Force, Reid notes, did propose improvements in "the quality 
and availability of economic and financial data relevant to the formulation of anti-
trust policy." REID, supra note 4, at 269. 
•• "Line-of-business" reporting requires certain corporations to file business data 
broken down according to industry or the various markets in which they sell. It is 
anticipated that this will provide more accurate and useful economic data. 44 U.S.C. 
§§ 3502 and 3512 did not actually authorize "line-of-business" reporting, but did 
transfer approval power to the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, when 
businessmen had been able to stop the program through the Office of Management and 
Budget, an executive office. Though the Federal Trade Commission did not lack au-
thority before, a strong mandate for "line-of-business" reports can be found in the 
history of the legislation. 
" Hopefully the appointment of activist Michael Pertschuk to the chairmanship 
of the Commission will revitalize the agency. Any judicial impediment should be 
removed by the excellent and comprehensive opinion in In re FTC Corporate Patterns 
Report, Master File Misc. 76-0126 and In re FTC Line of Business Report, Master File 
Misc. 76-0127 (D.D.C. April12, 1977). 
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will not receive it for a year.20 His stories and examples ring true 
because, stripped of their hypothetical presentation, they are 
realistic and understandable.21 
Orr also gains our attention because we are forced to con-
ceptualize common problems in terms of economic theories. 
For example, the operation of the market is introduced in terms 
of its effect on the loss of scenic environment22 and its relation-
ship to racial problems.23 By focusing the discussion of theories 
on their relationship to current social issues, Orr keeps us inter-
ested in those theories. In short, this work appears to be a very 
useful self-teaching tool for one with virtually no economic 
training. 
Despite its general simplicity, however, the book does con-
tain some advanced material. These sections should not imme-
diately repel those of us who have long since developed the 
habit of avoiding anything which smacks of mathematics. The 
author has made a conscious effort to insulate the unsophisti-
cated from this confusion. The book does include technical 
sections for those who want more depth, but these are carefully 
marked so they are easily bypassed by those who will find fog 
rather than sunlight. 
This book is a teaching tool and not an authority. A lawyer 
looking for authority to cite on industrial organization should 
look to Scherer, 24 which has somewhat displaced Bain's founda-
tion piece25 as the basic authority in the area. Scherer's work 
assumes that the reader is more knowledgeable; hence, while 
comprehensible to the uninitiated, he does not present the 
21 D. ORR, PROPERTY, MARKETS, AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: A TExTBOOK IN 
MtcROECONOMIC THEoRY AND ITs CuRRENT APPLICATIONs 175 (1976). 
21 For example, the author presents a convict fable, id. at 24, which must be 
derived from a classic study of the evolution of a market economy in a prisoner-of-war 
camp. Radford, The Economic Organization of a P. 0. W. Camp, XII ECONOMICA 189-
201 (Nov. 1945) (New series). 
22 ORR, supra note 20, at 14. 
23 Id. at 15-16. 
21 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1970). See 1,1/so W.G. SHEPHERD, MARKET PoWER AND EcoNOMIC WELFARE (1970); W.G. 
SHEPHERD, THE TREATMENT OF MARKET POWER: ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISE (1975). 
25 J.S. BAIN, supra note 13. See also, J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw CoMPETITlON 
(1956) (a combination text and empirical work that first tested interrelationships 
between concentration and barriers to entry and their joint effects on performance). 
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material from quite as elementary a starting point. More im-
portantly, Scherer does not pay such consistent attention to the 
lack of formal economic training of those outside the discipline. 
These two books share an aggressively practical look into 
a useful area of economics. Taken together they offer a concise 
education in industrial organization economics, an education 
which is increasingly important in areas such as corporation 
law or any of the various substantive areas of administrative 
law. 
Charles Koch, Jr.* 
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. 1966, University of 
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